

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15

USIA-15 ACDA-19 NEA-10 TRSE-00 MBFR-04 SAJ-01 OMB-01

DRC-01 /146 W

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R 120030Z SEP 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1523

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4259

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-79

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: CSCE-CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBM'S)

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: A) STATE 162304; B) USNATO 4091

SUMMARY. PURSUANT TO AUGUST 31 SENIOR POLADS DISCUSSION (REF B), AT SEPTEMBER 11 MEETING POLADS TOOK UP PAPER ON ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS (POLADS (73)14) ON BASIS US RESERVATIONS REGARDING INCLUSION OF MOVEMENTS IN CSCE CONTEXT. US REP DREW ON REF A. MAJORITY OF COMMITTEE, ON INSTRUCTIONS, REACTED NEGATIVELY TO US POSITION ON BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL GROUNDS. ACTION REQUESTED: CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMITTEE WILL RETURN TO SUBJECT AT SEPTEMBER 18 MEETING, AT WHICH TIME WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE ON COURSE OF ACTPON PROPOSED IN PARA 5 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

1. US REP OPENED DISCUSSION BY DRAWING FULLY ON PARAS 1 AND 2 OF REF A, STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THAT ALLIES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EXISTING DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS IN MPT MANDATE, CALLING ATTENTION TO DANGER OF OVERLAP BETWEEN CSCE CBM ON MOVEMENTS AND MBFR CONSTRAINTS, AND POINTING OUT POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF CBM ON MOVEMENTS FOR ALLIED MILITARY FLEXIBILITY.

2. REACTION OF MOST MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE TO US PROPOSAL WAS DECIDEDLY NEGATIVE ON BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND TACTICAL GROUNDS. UK REP POINTED OUT THAT MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS WERE TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN MPT MANDATE ONLY BECAUSE SOVIETS HAD REFUSED ACCEPT EQUAL TREATMENT. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT ALLIES HAD INVESTED MUCH POLITICAL CAPITAL IN OBTAINING INCLUSION OF MOVEMENTS AND WOULD BE ILL-ADVISED DROP IT NOW. UK REP NOTED LONDON'S ASSESSMENT THAT AGREEMENT AT GENEVA ON CBM COVERING NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS WAS MOST UNLIKELY, BUT THAT DISCUSSION OF ISSUE WOULD BE USEFUL IN ITSELF, SINCE IT WOULD EXPOSE SOVIET POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY TO NEUTRALS. THIS WOULD, HE ARGUED, GIVE WEST MAJOR TACTICAL ADVANTAGE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE THROWN AWAY. UK REP AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE SOME OVERLAP BETWEEN CBM ON MOVEMENTS AND MBFR CONSTRAINTS ON SAME SUBJECT, BUT HE ARGUED THAT CBM'S WERE SO CLEARLY DIFFERENT FROM CONSTRAINTS (I.E. PERMISSIVE, VOLUNTARY CHARACTER, LARGELY POLITICAL NATURE) THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE MANAGED. IN CONCLUSION, UK REP NOTED PROBLEM INVOLVED IN DRAWING CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS, A POINT WHICH IS MADE IN PARA 5 OF POLADS(73)14, AND SAID IF CBM ON MOVEMENTS WERE DROPPED, SOVIETS COULD CIRCUMVENT INTENT OF CBM'S BY CALLING AN EXERCISE A MOVEMENT, UK REP ASKED WHETHER US HAD DEVELOPED CRITERIA FOR MAKING DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOVEMENTS AND EXERCISES. US REP RESPONDED, DRAWING ON PREVIOUS GUIDANCE, THAT WE BELIEVED THIS AND OTHER POINTS OF DETAIL REGARDING CBM'S SHOULD BE CLARIFIED BY MEANS OF ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS.

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3. FRG REP SUPPORTED UK POSITION AND ADVISED THAT BONN ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY IN CSCE, IN PARTICULAR SINCE THIS SERVED TO MAKE POINT THAT MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY WERE INSEPARABLE. ANY STEP WHICH HAD EFFECT OF WEAKENING ALREADY "THIN" SECURITY CONTENT OF CSCE WOULD WORK AGAINST THIS POSITION, FRG REP SAID. IN ADDITION, HE ARGUED THAT BONN DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DRAW AND MAINTAIN LINE BETWEEN CBM'S AND MBFR CONSTRAINTS IF WE KEEP IN MIND THAT CONSTRAINTS WERE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION (SIC) AND LINKED WITH REDUCTIONS OF FORCES. DUTCH AND BELGIAN REPS SUPPORTED FRG ARGUMENTS. BELGIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT IN VIEW FACT THAT AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENTS WOULD ALMOST

CERTAINLY NOT BE REACHED AT CSCE, IT WAS MUCH MORE  
ADVISABLE TO LEAVE IT TO SOVIETS TO SHOOT THIS PROPOSAL  
DOWN AND THUS INCUR ANNOYANCE OF NEUTRALS. NORWEGIAN  
REP MADE SIMILAR ARGUMENTS AGAINST DROPPING MOVEMENTS AND  
NOTED WITH REFERENCE TO LIKELY WARSAW PACT REACTION THAT  
RECENT NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ON CSCE BY HUNGARIAN FIRST  
DEPFONMIN PUJA CATEGORICALLY RULED OUT AGREEMENT ON MOVE-  
MENTS. GREEK REP SAID ATHENS WISHED RETAIN MOVEMENTS.  
ITALIAN REP SAID ROME COULD NOT AGREE TO US PROPOSAL,  
DESPITE FACT THAT ITALIANS AGREE WITH GENERAL VIEW THAT  
AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENTS WAS UNLIKELY. HE SUGGESTED THAT  
ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO TRY DRAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAJOR  
MOVEMENTS WHICH BY THEIR NATURE WERE HIGHLY DESTABILIZING,  
AND LESS IMPORTANT MOVEMENTS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE SUBJECT TO  
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION. (COMMENT: THERE WERE NO REACTIONS  
TO THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH TENDS TO RUN COUNTER TO BASIC  
ALLIED APPROACH TO QUESTION OF DEFINITIONS. END COMMENT.)

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4259

4. CANADIAN REP ADVISED THAT OTTAWA CAME DOWN SOMEWHERE  
BETWEEN US POSITION AND THAT OF MAJORITY IN THAT CANADIANS  
SEE SOME MERIT IN US CONCERN THAT CBM ON MOVEMENTS COULD  
CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR MBFR CONSTRAINTS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW  
GREAT EFFORT WHICH ALLIES MADE IN HELSINKI TO RETAIN MOVE-

MENTS AND TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN PRESSING FOR MOVEMENTS  
IN GENEVA, CANADIANS DO NOT BELIEVE ALLIES SHOULD DROP  
PROPOSAL NOW.

5. COMMENT: WE ASSUME THAT WHEN SUBJECT IS DISCUSSED  
AT SEPTEMBER 18 POLADS MEETING THOSE DELEGATIONS WHICH  
DID NOT HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TODAY, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION  
OF TURKEY, WILL LINE UP WITH MAJORITY. MISSION DOES NOT  
BELIEVE THAT FURTHER STUDY OR DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT IS LIKELY  
TO RESULT IN ALLIED CONSENSUS. TO HANDLE  
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PROBLEM, MISSION SUGGESTS THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO PROPOSE  
AT SEPTEMBER 18 MEETING THAT FOLLOWING TEXT BE ADDED AS  
FOOTNOTE TO FIRST PARA OF POLADS(73)14: "THE UNITED STATES  
DELEGATION CALLED ATTENTION TO CERTAIN PROBLEMS WHICH IT  
FEELS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BEFORE THE ALLIES MOVE AHEAD WITH  
A PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY  
MOVEMENTS AS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE IN CSCE. SPECI-  
FICALLY, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER  
THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A MEASURE FOR MBFR CONSTRAINTS AND  
FOR ALLIED MILITARY FLEXIBILITY." AT SAME TIME, WE WOULD  
PROPOSE TO MAKE CLEAR PRIVATELY TO OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT WHILE  
WE WOULD NOT BE IN POSITION AT GENEVA TO ARGUE IN FAVOR OF  
INCLUDING MOVEMENTS WE WOULD NOT SPEAK OUT AGAINST  
ALLIED PROPOSALS TO THAT EFFECT.  
RUMSFELD

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 02 APR 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 SEP 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973NATO04259  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS, 12-31-79  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730962/abqcebzbj.tel  
**Line Count:** 194  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A) STATE 162304; B) USNATO 4091  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 16 JUL 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <16-Jul-2001 by kellew0>; APPROVED <17-Sep-2001 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CSCE-CONFIDENCE-BUILDMEASURES MEASURES (CBM'S)  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO BONN  
LONDON  
PARIS  
ROME  
THE HAGUE  
GENEVA

USCINCEUR  
USNMR SHAPE

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005